



1 **Impact of wildfires on Canada's oilsands facilities**

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11 **Abstract.**

12 Exponential growth of oil and gas facilities in wildlands from one side and an anticipated increase of global
13 warming from the other have exposed such facilities to an ever-increasing risk of wildfires. Extensive
14 oilsands operations in Canadian wildlands especially in the Province of Alberta along with the recent
15 massive wildfires in the province requires the development of quantitative risk assessment (QRA)
16 methodologies which are presently lacking in the context of wildfire-related technological accidents. The
17 present study is an attempt to integrate Canadian online wildfire information systems with current QRA
18 techniques in a dynamic risk assessment framework for wildfire-prone process plants. The developed
19 framework can easily be customized to other process plants potentially exposed to wildfires worldwide
20 provided that the required wildfire information is available.

21

22 **Keywords:** Wildfires; Process plants; Domino effect; Quantitative risk assessment; Natech accidents

23



24 **Nomenclature**

- 25 API: American Petroleum Institute
26 BUI: buildup index
27 D: flame depth
28 DC: drought code
29 DMC: duff moisture code
30 FBP: fire behavior prediction
31 FFMC: fine fuel moisture code
32 FWI: fire weather index
33 F_{view} : view factor
34 h: flame height
35 H: fuel's low heat of combustion
36 HFI: head fire intensity
37 ISI: initial spread index
38 L: flame length
39 $P(\cdot)$: marginal damage probability of target vessel
40 $P(\cdot|w)$: conditional damage probability of target vessel given a wildfire
41 P_{arr} : probability of a smoldering fire escalating to a flaming fire
42 P_B : burn probability
43 P_{ign} : probability of ignition given a long-continuing current
44 P_I : probability of ignition
45 P_{LCC} : probability of a long-continuing current
46 P_{sur} : probability that a smoldering ignition survives
47 P_w : probability of wildfire
48 Q: reaction intensity
49 Q_x : heat radiation at the distance of x
50 r: fire's rate of spread in the direction of the fire head
51 ROS: rate of spread
52 ttf: time to failure of target vessel
53 V: volume of target vessel
54 w: fuel's combustion rate in the flaming zone
55 WIPP: wildfire ignition probability predictor
56 x: horizontal distance from the flame's centre



- 57 Y : probit value
- 58 σ : probability of a tree's self ignition
- 59 θ : probability of fire spread from one tree to the others
- 60 λ : probability of tree growth in an empty cell
- 61 τ_a : atmospheric transmissivity
- 62 Φ : cumulative standard normal distribution
- 63



64 **1. Introduction**

65 Weather-related disasters, especially heatwaves, wildfires, droughts, floods and hurricanes have been
66 foreseen to affect around two-thirds of the European population annually by the end of this century
67 (Forzieri et al., 2017). Canada and the U.S. are no exception as evident by the recent hurricanes, floods, and
68 wildfires which devastated the states of Texas and California in the U.S. and the provinces of British
69 Columbia and Alberta in Canada. Aside from the impact of such natural disasters on the environment and
70 urban areas, their effect on industrial plants and hazardous facilities (process plants, nuclear plants, etc.)
71 has started to raise concerns in academia, the industry, and regulatory bodies.

72 Massive fires in a refinery in Turkey in 1999 during the Kocaeli earthquake, substantial release of
73 petroleum products and chemicals in the U.S. during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and Hurricane Harvey in
74 2017, extensive damage to coastal industrial complexes in Japan in 2011 during the Great Sendai
75 Earthquake and the following tsunami, and shut-down of oilsands plants which incurred enormous oil
76 production losses during massive wildfires in Canada in 2016 are just some examples among the others.

77 Although the hazard of wildfires in ecological and urban risk assessment studies has long been recognized
78 (Preisler et al., 2004; Beverly and Bothwell, 2011; Scott et al., 2012, 2013; Lozano et al., 2016), the relevant
79 work in the context of wildland-prone industrial complexes has been very limited, if any. In Europe, for
80 example, Seveso Directive III (2012) has only recently mandated the member states to consider the
81 probability of natural disasters in the risk assessment of major accident scenarios when preparing safety
82 reports (Article 10), with an explicit mention of floods and earthquakes (the Annex II) but the wildfires.
83 The most of European countries that consider natechs have likewise limited their focus to only a few
84 natural hazards (Krausmann and Baranzini, 2012). Table 1 exemplifies some of such efforts.

85 Exponential growth of industrial facilities and the subsequent prolongation of wildland-industry interfaces
86 from one side and an anticipated increase of global warming from the other are expected to increase the
87 frequency and severity of technological accidents caused by natural disasters, including the wildfires.

88 In May 2015, a massive wildfire in northern Alberta, Canada, spread into the oilsands areas, threatening
89 several operations and keeping about 10% of the production offline. Two major petroleum companies,
90 Canadian Natural and Cenovus Energy, shut down their 80,000 and 135,000-barrel-a-day operations,
91 respectively, for safety precautions as the fires approached Foster Creek oilsands facility and Caribou South
92 natural gas plant (Mining.Com, 2015).

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


94 **Table 1.** Natural hazards considered in safety assessment and management of process plants in European Union
 95 (Krausmann and Baranzini, 2012).

Country	Natural hazard
Lithuania	Floods
Slovakia	Floods
Czech Republic	Mainly floods
UK	Mainly floods
Romania	Floods, landslides, earthquakes
Germany	Floods, storms, earthquakes
France	Floods, landslides, earthquakes, lightning
Italy	Floods, storms, earthquakes, lightning, wildfire
Netherlands	All-hazards approach*

96 * It is not identified whether it accounts for wildfires.

97 In May 2016, a wildfire burned part of Fort McMurray, Alberta, Canada, and spread towards oilsands plants
 98 north of the city where major oilsands production plants Syncrude and Suncor Energy along with some
 99 smaller petroleum operations were located, resulting in a 40% drop in production at nearby oilsands
 100 facilities (Figure 1).



101
 102 **Figure 1.** Wildfire in Fort McMurray and the location of affected oilsands plants: ① Canadian Natural Resources, ②
 103 Syncrude joint venture, ③ Imperial Oil, ④ Shell Canada, ⑤ Husky Energy/BP, ⑥ Suncor, ⑦ Athabasca, ⑧ Nexen
 104 (CNOOC), ⑨ Japan Canada Oil Sands, ⑩ Connacher Oil and Gas, ⑪ ConocoPhillips, ⑫ Statoil (Maclean's, 2016a).



105 The operations shutdowns or reductions were also influenced by precautionary shutdowns of pipeline
106 carrying diluent, a flammable substance needed to thin the oilsands bitumen, resulting in roughly as much
107 as one million barrels a day reduction of the oilsands' output (Maclean's, 2016a). The wildfire did not cause
108 damage to oilsands plants and process equipment, but it burned down a 665-unit worker accommodation
109 camp northern Fort McMurray (Global News, 2016a). But what would have happened if the fire had
110 reached the oilsands mines and the production facilities?

111 As far as it concerns the oilsands mines, bitumen, the main component of oilsands, does not easily catch fire
112 (Global News, 2016b). Considering the fact that 80% of bitumen is buried deep underground, the bitumen
113 in oilsands mines is mixed with sand (similar to asphalt), and would probably smolder if ignited (Maclean's,
114 2016b). However, oilsands projects rely on two highly flammable substances for the extraction, process,
115 and transport the bitumen: Natural gas and diluent, which is a very light petroleum substance.

116 Natural gas is used to generate power for the plants and heat up the steam used to liquefy the bitumen.
117 Diluent, on the other hand, is used to dilute the crude bitumen thin enough to flow through pipelines. Both
118 the natural gas and diluent can pose high risks if exposed to fire though the pipes carrying them are usually
119 buried underground.

120 Oilsands process plants are usually accompanied by large tank terminals in the vicinity to store oil
121 products. Exposed to external fires (such as wildfire), buckling of atmospheric storage tanks and spill of
122 hydrocarbons, tank fires, vapor cloud explosions, and explosion of pressurized tanks can be recognized as
123 potential risks (Heymes et al., 2013, Godoy 2016). In case one or more storage tanks are ignited by the
124 wildfire, the tank fire(s) can impact adjacent storage tanks, leading to a fire domino effect.

125 In order to protect oilsands facilities from wildfires (and also protect the forest from potential ignition
126 sources at the facilities), there is a buffer zone (safety distance in the form of vegetation-free ground)
127 between facilities and forest vegetation. In the absence of methodologies to quantify the risk imposed by
128 wildfires, such buffer zones are usually determined based on rule-of-thumb guidelines (e.g., see FireSmart,
129 2012). Numerical simulations of storage tanks exposed to wildfire has, however, demonstrated that in the
130 most cases such safety distances would not suffice (Heymes et al., 2013).

131 Due to extensive oilsands operations in Canadian wildlands, in the present study, we have developed a
132 dynamic framework, mainly based on available techniques and daily updated wildfire maps made available
133 online by Government of Canada, to assess the impact of wildfires on oilsands facilities. Since the
134 framework is modular, it can be tailored to assess the risk of wildfires at process plants in wildfire-prone
135 areas worldwide. Section 2 revisits the Canadian wildland fire information system; in Section 3, the



136 components of wildfire risk assessment are described and quantified; Section 4 is devoted to the impact
137 assessment of wildfires on process facilities; Section 5 concludes the study.

138 **2. Canadian Wildfire Information System**

139 In Canada, two systems are being used to determine the characteristics and the hazard of wildfires:
140 Canadian Forest Fire Weather Index System, and Canadian Forest Fire Behavior Prediction System. The
141 former is mostly concerned with the estimation of wildfires' basic components (e.g., flammability of
142 vegetation) whereas the latter deals with the dynamics of wildfires (e.g., fire intensity). Since in the present
143 study the identification and quantification of wildfires in Canadian wildlands are mainly based on the
144 foregoing two systems, they will be recapitulated in this section.


145 **2.1. Forest Fire Weather Index System**

146 Wildfires, like other types of fire, can be defined using the fire triangle consisting of fuel (trees, grasses,
147 shrubs), oxygen, and heat source. As much as it concerns the fuel, parameters such as the fine fuel moisture
148 code (FFMC), which is the moisture content of litter and other crude fire fuels, duff moisture code (DMC),
149 which is the moisture content of loosely compacted organic layers of moderate depth and woody materials,
150 and drought code (DC), which is the average moisture content of deep compact organic layers and large
151 logs, are taken into account to determine both the ease of ignition and the flammability of the available fuel.

152 DMC and DC are combined together to determine the total amount of combustible materials in the form of a
153 so-called buildup index (BUI). Accordingly, the wind and the FFMC are combined to predict the rate of fire
154 spread in the form of a so-called initial spread index (ISI). Having the BUI and the ISI, the fire weather index
155 (FWI), as an indication of fire danger, can be determined as shown in Figure 2 (Natural Resources Canada).

156 Figure 3(a) illustrates the fire weather index (FWI) of Canada on May 1, 2016, a day before the Fort
157 McMurray wildfire. Based on the FWI and the type of fire (surface fire, crown fire, intermittent crown
158 involvement), the fire danger index can be determined (low, moderate, high, very high, extreme) as an
159 indication of how easy it is to ignite the forest fuel, how difficult it is to control the fire, and the type of
160 firefighting equipment needed (pumps, tanker trucks, bulldozer, aircraft, etc.) as shown in Figure 3(b).


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163

Figure 2. Identification of fire weather index (Natural Resources Canada)



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165

(a)

(b)

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Figure 3. (a) Fire weather index, and (b) Fire danger index of Canada on May 1, 2016 (Natural Resources Canada).


167 2.2. Forest Fire Behavior Prediction System

168 To quantify the impact of wildfires on industrial plants, quantitative estimates of head fire spread rate, fuel
 169 consumption, and fire intensity are needed. Canadian Forest Fire Behavior Prediction System employs an
 170 elliptical fire growth model (Tymstra et al., 2010) to estimate the fire area, perimeter, perimeter growth



171 rate, and flank and back fire behavior. The rate of spread (ROS) is the predicted speed (m/min) of the fire
172 head (fire front), which is calculated based on the fuel type, initial spread index (ISI), buildup index (BUI),
173 crown base height, and other parameters (Natural Resources Canada).

174 Head fire intensity (HFI) is an estimate of the energy output per meter of the fire front (kW/m), calculated
175 based on the rate of spread (ROS) and total fuel consumption (kg/m²). The rate of spread (ROS) and head
176 fire intensity (HFI) indices calculated by the Canadian Wildland Fire Information System a day before the
177 start of the Fort McMurray wildfire are shown in Figures 4(a) and (b), respectively (Natural Resources
178 Canada).



181 **Figure 4.** (a) Fire rate of spread, and (b) Head fire intensity in Canada on May 1, 2016 (Natural Resources Canada).

182 3. Wildfire Risk Assessment

183 In wildfire risk assessment, the ignition probability, burn probability (the probability that wildfire reaches
184 to a certain spot), type of fire (surface fire, crown fire, intermittent crown involvement) and fire intensity
185 are the main factors to take into account (Scott et al., 2013).

186 Many methodologies have been developed to predict the ignition probability (Latham and Schlieter, 1989;
187 Lawson et al., 1994; Anderson, 2002), to model surface fire spread (Rothermel, 1972), crown fire spread
188 (Rothermel, 1991), and transition between surface and crown fire spread (van Wagner, 1977). Accordingly,
189 a number of software tools such as FARSITE (Finney, 1998), FlamMap5 (Finney, 2006), FSPro (Finney et al.,



190 2011a), and FSim (Finney et al., 2011b) have been developed based on historical records of regional
191 wildfires, weather conditions, type and density of vegetation in the landscape, and the topology of the
192 landscape. Using the developed models and software tools, the risk imposed by wildfires on an oilsands
193 facility can be modeled as the product of the wildfire probability, P_w , and the severity of consequences,
194 preferably in monetary units as:

$$195 \text{ Wildfire's risk} = P_w \cdot \text{Consequence} \quad (1)$$

196 Given the geographical location of the facility, the probability of wildfire at the borders of the facility can be
197 estimated as the probability of having a small fire somewhere at the landscape (P_I) times the probability of
198 the small fire growing to a wildfire larger than 400 m² in area and reaching the location of the facility (P_B):

$$199 P_w = P_I \cdot P_B \quad (2)$$

200 P_I and P_B are also known as ignition probability and burn probability, respectively. Exposed to a wildfire,
201 the potential consequences and their severity depend on the wildfire intensity and the facility's
202 vulnerability to wildfire: $C = f(\text{fire intensity, facility's vulnerability})^1$. In the following sections we will
203 describe the components of wildfire risk in further detail and explain how they can be estimated or
204 acquired from available (mostly freely accessible) models and databases, with a particular emphasis on
205 Canadian forest fire system.

206 **3.1. Ignition probability**

207 Wildfires can be categorized as hydro-geological events which are bound to increase especially due to
208 global warming. Every degree in warming increases the possibility of lightning, which is one of the major
209 triggers of wildfires, by 12% (Romps et al., 2014). Likewise, 15% more precipitation would be needed to
210 offset the increased risk of wildfires due to one degree increment of warming (Flannigan et al., 2016).
211 Nevertheless, man-made fires (burning campfires, cigarettes) account for 80% of wildfires (National
212 Geographic).

213 Weather conditions such as temperature, relative humidity, and wind speed are key factors in the
214 probability estimation of an ignition (small fire) which can lead to a wildfire. In addition to the weather
215 conditions, the vegetation moisture content (equal to FFMC) plays a key role not only in the initiation of fire
216 (the ignition probability) but also in the continuation and spread of fire (fuel flammability) (Chuvieco et al.,
217 2004).

¹ In the present study, we do not consider the indirect risk incurred by, among others, loss of production due to plant's precautionary shutdowns, staff evacuation, or the like.



218 Based on the measurement of FFMC in consecutive time periods before the start of a potential wildfire, the
219 logistic regression has been used to roughly predict P_1 based on FFMC (Larjavaara et al., 2004; Jurdao et al.,
220 2012). Similarly, Preisler et al. (2004) used the logistic regression to predict the probability of small fires
221 (equivalent to P_1) based on parameters such as burning index, fire potential index, drought code, wind
222 speed, relative humidity, dry bulb temperature, day of the year, and the elevation.


223 Lawson et al. (1996) developed an application called Wildfire Ignition Probability Predictor (WIPP) to
224 predict, on an hourly or daily basis, the P_1 of man-made wildfires in British Columbia forests, Canada. Based
225 on the calculations of FFMC and 10-meter wind speed, WIPP estimates P_1 in three categories as low (0-
226 50%), medium (50-75%), and high (75-100%). Considering the lightning as one of the main triggers of
227 wildfires, Canadian Wildland Fire System estimates the time-dependent probability of lightning-caused
228 ignitions as (Anderson 2002):

$$229 \quad P_1 = P_{LCC} \cdot P_{ign} \cdot P_{sur} \cdot P_{arr} \quad (3)$$

230 where P_{LCC} is the probability of a long-continuing current (85% for positive flashes, 20% for negative
231 flashes across Canada); P_{ign} is the probability of ignition given a long-continuing current, determined by
232 fuel type, forest floor depth, and moisture conditions (Latham and Schlieter 1989; Anderson 2002); P_{sur} is
233 the probability that a smoldering ignition will continue to survive as a smoldering fire, determined by the
234 fuel moisture, the bulk density, and the inorganic content of the forest floor (Hartford 1989; Anderson
235 2002); P_{arr} is the probability of a smoldering fire escalating to a flaming fire (Lawson et al. 1994; Forestry
236 Canada Fire Danger Working Group 1992; Anderson 2002).

237 Wildfire-prone provinces in Canada such as Alberta and British Columbia provide ignition probability maps
238 on a daily basis both for the current day and the next day. Figure 5 depicts the P_1 map for the Province of
239 Alberta administrated by Alberta Agriculture and Forestry.

240



241

242

Figure 5. Wildfire ignition probability (P_i) in Alberta, Canada (<http://wildfire.alberta.ca>)

243 3.2. Burn probability

244 Burn probability (P_B) is the conditional probability that a small fire somewhere in the landscape would
245 escalate to a wildfire and burn somewhere else in the landscape. Estimation of P_B is challenging as the
246 spread of wildfire from one point to another is a complicated process affected by many factors such as the
247 type of vegetation (fuel), weather conditions, and land topology. These factors, in turn, consist of several
248 key parameters such as the flammability of fuel, vertical arrangement of fuel, moisture content of fuel, wind
249 speed and direction, relative humidity, the orientation of fire (downhill or uphill), the type of fire (surface
250 fire, crown fire, surface-crown transition), etc.

251 Considering the foregoing fire spread parameters, P_B can be estimated as the relative frequency of
252 wildfires' burning a certain spot given a number of small fires at different spots of the landscape (Scott et
253 al., 2013). Models developed for wildfire spread simulation include empirical, semi-empirical, and physical
254 models (Pastor et al., 2003). Some of these models such as FARSITE² (Finney, 1998) and BehavePlus
255 (Andrews, 2013) need detailed spatial information on topography, fuels, and weather conditions, not
256 readily available for many locations of interest. A comprehensive review of wildfire simulation models can
257 be found in Papadopoulos and Pavlidou (2010). Less sophisticated models and software have also been
258 developed for fire spread modeling and investigating whether a small fire at point A would evolve as a
259 wildfire at point B in the landscape.

260 Drossel and Schwabl (1992) developed a simple forest-fire model based on the following assumptions:

² FARSITE is available from <https://www.firelab.org/project/farsite>.




- 261 • considering the landscape as a grid, each cell (A) can have three states: “empty”, “occupied by tree”,
 262 and “burning tree”, that is, $A = (\text{empty}, \text{tree}, \text{burning})$.
- 263 • fire from a burning cell can spread with a probability of θ to other cells in its Moore neighborhood
 264 (i.e., at most eight other cells). In other words, if cell B is in the Moore neighborhood of cell A, $P(B^{t+1}$
 265 $= \text{burning} \mid B^t = \text{tree}, A^t = \text{burning}) = \theta$.
- 266 • a cell can ignite with a probability of σ (self ignition probability) even if no other cells in its
 267 neighborhood are on fire; that is, $P(B^{t+1} = \text{burning} \mid B^t = \text{tree}, A^t = \text{tree}) = \sigma$.
- 268 • an empty cell can be filled with a probability of λ with a tree (usually considered if time between
 269 two sequential fires would be long enough to allow for growing new plantation). In other words,
 270 $P(B^{t+1} = \text{tree} \mid B^t = \text{empty}) = \lambda$.

271 Fire spread models can be coupled with Monte Carlo simulation to estimate P_B . For instance, Figure 6
 272 depicts the output of the forest-fire model encoded in a Javascript program³, where a random small fire
 273 ignited somewhere south of the landscape (Figure 6(a)) evolves to a wildfire (Figure 6(b)). Assuming that
 274 the process facility of interest (e.g., oilsands plant or oil terminal) is located in the north of the landscape,
 275 the probability of the wildfire reaching the facility (cells) north of the landscape can thus roughly be
 276 estimated as:

$$277 P_B = \frac{n}{N} \tag{4}$$

278 where N is the total number of Monte Carlo simulations, that is, the total number of random small fires at
 279 different spots of the landscape; n is the total number of simulations where a small fire turned out as a
 280 wildfire and reached the north of the landscape (Figure 6(c)).

281



282
 283 (a) (b) (c)
 284 **Figure 6.** Wildfire spread in a hypothetical landscape. (a) Ignition of small fire south of the landscape. (b) The small
 285 fire escalates as a wildfire. (c) The wildfire reaches the process facility north of the landscape.

³ The program is available from <http://www.shodor.org/interactivate/activities/Fire/>.



286 Similar attempts have been made, for example, using NetLogo (Wilensky, 1997), which is a multi-agent
287 programmable modeling environment, to model fire spread yet based on simplistic assumptions and a
288 limited number of parameters (e.g., density of trees).


289 3.3. Fire intensity

290 Head fire intensity (HFI) is the rate of heat release per unit length of the fire head (kW/m), regardless of
291 the fire's depth. HFI, which is also known as Byram's fire intensity or frontal fire intensity, can be calculated
292 as (Byram, 1959):

$$293 \text{HFI} = H \cdot w \cdot r \quad (5)$$

294 where H (kJ/kg) is the fuel's low heat of combustion, w (kg/m²) is the fuel's combustion rate in the flaming
295 zone, and r (m/s) is the fire's spread rate in the direction of the fire head (Figure 7). H is equal to the high
296 heat of combustion minus the heat losses from radiation, incomplete combustion, and fuel moisture.
297 Compared to the other parameters in Byram's fire intensity, H varies slightly from fuel to fuel and can thus
298 be considered as a constant. Alexander (1982) suggests a basic value of 18700 kJ/kg.

299



300

301 **Figure 7.** Different zones of a wildfire (adapted from Wikipedia).


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303 Values of r and w , however, can vary significantly for different fuels. Considering r , for instance, a grass fire
304 may travel at a rate of $r = 5$ km/h whereas fire in a dry eucalypti forest may travel at a rate of $r = 1$ km/h
305 capable of throwing embers up to 1 km ahead of the fire (Cheney, 1990). As a result, HFI can vary from 15
306 to 100,000 kW/m (Byram, 1959) though it rarely exceeds 50,000 kW/m, and for the most of crown fires
307 lies in the range of 10,000–30,000 kW/m (Alexander, 1982). Having the flame length, L (m), Byram (1959)
308 has suggested Equation (6) to calculate the HFI of surface fires:

$$309 \text{HFI} = 260 L^{2.174} \quad (6)$$



310 In case of crown fires, one-half of the mean canopy height should be added to L (Byram, 1959). Flame
311 length (L), flame height (h), and the flame depth (D) have been depicted in Figure 8. At very low wind
312 speeds on level terrain, h and L can be considered the same. A thorough review of developed relationships
313 to calculate the fire intensity based on the fire length can be found in Alexander and Cruz (2012).



314

315

Figure 8. Flame characteristics (Utah State University website).

316 Based on the flame length (L), the fire intensity (HFI) can also be classified into six classes (Scott et al.,
317 2013) as listed in Table 2; this way, the observations of L can be used to make rough estimates of HFI.

318

Table 2. Flame length range associated with six standard fire intensity classes.

Fire intensity class	Flame length (m)
Class 1	0.0 - 0.6
Class 2	0.6 - 1.2
Class 3	1.2 - 1.8
Class 4	1.8 - 2.4
Class 5	2.4 - 3.7
Class 6a	3.7 - 15
Class 6b	> 15

319

320 The fire intensity classes in Table 2 can be associated with the wildfire ranks used by the British Columbia
321 Wildfire Service⁴ for a quick description of fire behavior based on wildfire visual observations (Table 3).
322 Similar classes as of Tables 2 and 3 are also provided by Canadian wildfire protection agencies such as
323 Alberta Wildfire (Figure 9), which accordingly can be used to infer the flame length (L) using Table 2 and
324 then to estimate the fire intensity (HFI) using Equation (6). As another option, the head fire intensity maps
325 provided by the Canadian Wildfire System (Figure 4(b)) can be used to directly identify the HFI.


⁴ <https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/safety/wildfire-status/about-bcws/wildfire-response/fire-characteristics/rank>



326

Table 3. Wildfire ranks used by the British Columbia Wildfire Service to determine the fire intensity.

Visualization	Rank	Description	Characteristics
	1	Smouldering ground fire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smouldering ground fire • No open flame • White smoke • Slow (i.e. creeping) rate of fire spread
	2	Low vigor surface fire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Surface fire • Visible, open flame • Unorganized or inconsistent flame front • Slow rate of spread
	3	Moderately vigorous surface fire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organized flame front – fire progressing in organized manner • Occasional candling may be observed along the perimeter and/or within the fire • Moderate rate of spread
	4	Highly vigorous surface fire with torching, or passive crown fire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Grey to black smoke • Organized surface flame front • Moderate to fast rate of spread on the ground • Short aerial bursts through the forest canopy • Short-range spotting
	5	Extremely vigorous surface fire or active crown fire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Black to copper smoke • Organized crown fire front • Moderate to long-range spotting and independent spot fire growth
	6	A blow up or conflagration; extreme and aggressive fire behaviour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organized crown fire front • Long-range spotting and independent spot fire growth • Possible fireballs and whirls • Violent fire behaviour probable • A dominant smoke column may develop which influences fire behaviour



327

328

Figure 9. Wildfire intensity classes in Alberta, Canada (<http://wildfire.alberta.ca>)

329

330 Having the flame depth (D), the frontal fire intensity (HFI) can be converted to area-fire or reaction
331 intensity Q (kW/m^2) (Alexander, 1982):

$$332 \quad Q = \frac{HFI}{D} \quad (7)$$

333 Considering the flame as a solid body (Butler and Cohen, 2000; Heymes et al., 2013), the amount of reaction
334 intensity at a distance of x from the flame's ground centre (see Appendix) can be calculated using Solid
335 Flame Model (Mudan, 1987) as:

$$336 \quad Q_x = Q \cdot F_{view} \cdot \tau_a \quad (8)$$

337 where F_{view} , the view factor, is the fraction of the heat radiation received by a receptor (Assael and
338 Kakosimos, 2010), and $\tau_a \in [0, 1]$ is the atmospheric transmissivity, corresponding to the fraction of the
339 thermal radiation received by the receptor considering the mitigation effect of humidity and carbon dioxide
340 as well as the dissipation due to the distance. In the determination of safety zones, $\tau_a = 1$ is used for
341 conservative results (Heymes et al., 2013).

342 **4. Impact of wildfire on oil storage tanks**

343 During wildfires, the main threats to oilsands facilities – either the process plant or the storage terminal –
344 come from airborne embers and radiant heat. The threat of airborne embers is even greater since they are
345 able to travel with wind for several kilometers ahead of the fire front. The accumulation of airborne embers
346 near tank openings and vents or under the base of structures and process vessels, given enough vegetation
347 or spilled flammable hydrocarbons, can ignite a fire – also known as spotting (FireSmart, 2012) – which



348 may easily escalate to a major fire and possibly a domino effect given the large inventory of flammable
349 substances stored in the facility.

350 Assessing the risk of wildfire's embers is very tricky considering several influential parameters such as the
351 direction and speed of the wind, the trajectory of embers, the accumulation of embers near critical spots,
352 availability of onsite vegetation or spilled hydrocarbons, whose prediction is subject to large uncertainties
353 if not impossible. Despite the difficulties in impact assessment of wildfire embers, simple protection and
354 mitigation measures can be taken to effectively reduce their threat. For instance, limiting the use of floating
355 roof tanks as the most common type of tanks reportedly involved in tank fires (Godoy, 2016), encouraging
356 the use of cone roof tanks to prevent embers from landing around openings and vents, turning the vents
357 downward and covering the openings with wire mesh, removing vegetation around tanks and combustible
358 structures, and equipping the structures and storage tanks with sprinkler systems, are some of the
359 measures to tackle the risk of airborne embers (FireSmart, 2012).

360 Aside from the impact of embers, the radiant heat emitted from the wildfire can threaten the integrity and
361 safety of process vessels and storage tanks. The type and severity of such impact depend on the intensity of
362 the radiant heat received by target vessels as well as their type (atmospheric, pressurized, pipeline, etc.)
363 and dimension (usually their volume). Radiant heat acts as a thermal load on the wall of the vessels, which
364 are categorized as thin-walled structures, and affects the stiffness and strength properties of the wall
365 material (usually steel, in the oil and gas industry).

366 In the case of atmospheric storage tanks such as oil and gasoline tanks, this change in properties results in
367 wall weakening and is usually followed by large radial displacements in the form of buckling (Godoy,
368 2016). Buckling of steel storage tanks subject to thermal loading has thoroughly been investigated in Liu
369 (2011) and Mansour (2012). A review of oil storage steel tanks under different types of loads, including
370 thermal loading, can also be found in Godoy (2016). Exposed to external fires, empty or partially filled
371 storage tanks may receive up to five times higher temperature than completely filled tanks, and thus more
372 susceptible to buckling. For partially filled tanks, there is even a jump between the temperature below and
373 above the liquid level (Liu, 2011).

374 In addition to the possibility of buckling, which endangers the integrity of storage tanks, petroleum
375 products may ignite spontaneously at their autoignition temperatures in normal atmosphere without even
376 direct impingement of wildfire flames or airborne embers. Autoignition temperature of most of petroleum
377 products is between 200 to 250 degrees Celsius, well below the temperature required for buckling of steel
378 storage tanks and easily reachable for storage tanks exposed to radiant heat of wildfires. For intact



379 atmospheric storage tanks, the autoignition of flammable contents would most probably lead to tank fires
380 while for damaged storage tanks with spilled fuel in the catch basins it would lead to pool fires.

381 For pressurized tanks such as LPG⁵ tanks, on the other hand, BLEVE⁶ is the most likely scenario. BLEVE
382 occurs when the increase in the internal vapor pressure of the tank exposed to an external fire grows
383 beyond the strength of the already weakened tank wall, leading to the formation of a tear. If the tear
384 spreads to the entire length of the tank a BLEVE occurs, followed by a fireball; otherwise, a jet fire would be
385 expected (Birk and Cunningham, 1994). In order to prevent from the increase in the internal overpressure,
386 pressurized tanks are usually equipped with pressure relief valves or fusible plugs, which are nevertheless
387 likely to damage and fail to operate (CSB, 2008). Furthermore, to prevent from BLEVE, the American
388 Petroleum Institute (API) has identified a maximum heat radiation intensity of 22 kW/m² to which LPG
389 tanks should be exposed (API, 1996). Performance and safety of LPG tanks exposed to radiant heat of
390 wildfires have been investigated by Heymes et al. (2013).

391 Despite the fact that the risk of radiant heat seems easier to quantify (than the risk of airborne embers)
392 based on current techniques and available databases, it is missing in the available directives and guidelines.
393 For instance, the FireSmart[®], a Canadian field guide for protecting oil and gas facilities against wildfires,
394 identifies a rule-of-thumb minimum safety distance of 3m for propane tanks (pressurized tank) from forest
395 vegetation (FireSmart, 2012). However, Heymes et al. (2013) showed that even a small fire of 2m high and
396 5m wide is able to increase the internal pressure of LPG tanks and eventually lead to a BLEVE and
397 subsequent fireball.

398 Wildfire-induced fires in the form of tank fires or pool fires can trigger secondary fires or explosions in
399 other process vessels and storage tanks, leading to a domino effect. Figure 10 shows fire propagation in a
400 fuel storage plant in Puerto Rico in 2009 which initiated from overspill and ignition of a gasoline storage
401 tank and propagated to other 21 storage tanks out of 40 (CSB, 2015).

402 To quantify the impact of a wildfire on an oil and gas facilities, the damage probabilities of the process
403 vessels exposed to the wildfire's radiant heat (i.e., the primary vessels) as well as the damage probability of
404 neighboring vessels exposed to the heat radiation of fires at the primary vessels need to be assessed. In this
405 regard, dose-response relationships which associate the damage probability of process vessels to the
406 intensity of received heat radiation can be used.

⁵ Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), mostly consisting of propane and butane, is a flammable substance used as fuel in heating, cooking, and vehicles.

⁶ Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion



407

408

Figure 10. Fire domino effect in a tank farm in Puerto Rico in 2009 (CSB, 2015).

409 For instance, Cozzani et al. (2005) developed simplified probit functions to correlate the time to failure (ttf)
410 of vessels to their size and the intensity of received heat (a minimum required value of 15 kW/m² for
411 atmospheric vessels and 50 kW/m² for pressurized vessels). Equations (9)-(11) can be used to assess the
412 damage probability of atmospheric process vessels, including the storage tanks:


$$413 \quad \ln(ttf) = -1.13 \ln(Q_x) - 2.67 \times 10^{-5} V + 9.9 \quad (9)$$

$$414 \quad Y = 12.54 - 1.85 \ln(ttf) \quad (10)$$

$$415 \quad P = \phi(Y - 5) \quad (11)$$

416 where ttf (s) is the time to failure of the exposed vessel (due to wildfire's heat or a primary tank fire's heat);
417 Q_x (kW/m²) is the received heat radiation by the vessel, calculated using Equation (9); V (m³) is the volume
418 of the vessel; Y is the probit value; P is the damage probability of the vessel; $\phi(\cdot)$ is the cumulative standard
419 normal distribution. For the sake of exemplification, consider the hypothetical tank farm in Figure 11,
420 where atmospheric storage tanks T1 and T2 are exposed to the wildfire's radiant heat of greater than 15
421 kW/m² and may catch fire. Tank T3 is too far to damage directly by the wildfire's heat radiation but may
422 damage via a domino effect given wildfire-induced fires at T1 or T2.

423 Given the characteristics of the wildfire and the location of the tank farm (e.g., using Figure 4(b)) and the
424 distance of the storage tanks from the head fire, the amount of radiant heat received by T1 and T2 can be
425 calculated using Equations (7) and (8); accordingly, the conditional damage probabilities of the tanks given
426 the wildfire, i.e., $P(T1|w)$ and $P(T2|w)$, can be estimated using the probit functions given in Equations (9)-
427 (11). Given that the wildfire would ignite tank fires at either T1 or T2, three mutually exclusive domino
428 effect scenarios can be envisaged in which T3 would damage and catch fire from either T1 or T2 (Figure
429 12).




430

431

Figure 11. A hypothetical case of three atmospheric storage tanks exposed to wildfire.

432



433

434

Figure 12. Wildfire-induced domino effect scenarios. Tanks directly impacted by the wildfire have been denoted by color yellow.

437

438 As a result, $P(T3|w)$ can roughly be estimated as the aggregation of the three domino effect scenarios as
 439 $P(T3|w) = P(T3|w)_a + P(T3|w)_b + P(T3|w)_c$, where:

- 440 • Figure 12(a): $P(T3|w)_a = P(T1|w) \cdot (1 - P(T2|w)) \cdot \{P(T3|T1) \cup \{P(T2|T1) \cdot P(T3|T2)\}\}$
- 441 • Figure 12(b): $P(T3|w)_b = (1 - P(T1|w)) \cdot P(T2|w) \cdot \{P(T1|T2) \cdot P(T3|T1)\} \cup P(T3|T2)$
- 442 • Figure 12(c): $P(T3|w)_c = P(T1|w) \cdot P(T2|w) \cdot \{P(T3|T1) \cup P(T3|T2)\}$.

443 Similar to $P(T1|w)$ and $P(T2|w)$, the conditional probabilities $P(T1|T2)$, $P(T2|T1)$, $P(T3|T1)$, and $P(T3|T2)$
 444 $P(T2)$ can be estimated using probit functions in Equations (9)-(11) based on the amount of heat radiation a
 445 secondary tank receives from fire at a primary tank. Having the conditional damage probabilities of the
 446 storage tanks (conditioned on the occurrence of a wildfire of given characteristics), the marginal damage
 447 probabilities, e.g., for T3, can be calculated as $P(T3) = P_w \cdot P(T3|w) = P_i \cdot P_b \cdot P(T3|w)$.

448 For large oil and gas facilities with many process vessels of different type and dimension, in which
 449 complicated interaction among the process vessels would not allow a manual calculation of damage



450 probabilities, more sophisticated techniques such as Bayesian network (Khakzad et al., 2013) can be
451 employed.

452 5. Conclusions

453 The present study has been inspired by recent massive wildfires in the Province of Alberta, Canada,
454 jeopardizing the operation and safety of oilsands facilities as a key contributing factor to the nation's
455 economy. Despite the extensive oilsands operations in Canadian wildlands and an ever-increasing risk of
456 wildfires, mainly due to global warming, quantitative methodologies for assessing and managing the risk of
457 wildfires in the context of natural-technological accidents (i.e., technological accidents triggered by natural
458 disasters) are lacking.


459 In the present study, we made an attempt to develop a dynamic risk assessment methodology for wildfire-
460 prone process plants by integrating the Canadian online wildfire information system and available QRA
461 techniques. Since the wildfire information system is updated on a daily basis providing forecasts for the
462 same day and the next day, the developed methodology can help facilities owners and safety managers
463 predict the risk of wildfires at least a day ahead of time and thus devise appropriate protection and
464 mitigation measures.

465 In most of wildland oil and gas facilities, the separation distances (buffer zones) between oil facilities and
466 forest vegetation are usually determined based on approximate analyses (e.g., in Canada it is based on
467 FireSmart® guidelines). As such, the developed methodology can be employed not only in risk-based
468 identification of more dependable buffer zones but also in design of the layout of oil facilities so as to
469 increase their robustness against wildfire-induced domino effect scenarios.

470 Appendix

471 Identification of view factor in solid flame model

472



473



474

Figure 13. Flame as a tilted cylinder

475

476 F_{view} can be calculated as a function of vertical F_v and horizontal F_h view factors as (Assael and Kakosimos,
 477 2010):

$$478 \quad F_{\text{view}} = \sqrt{F_v^2 + F_h^2}$$

479 where:

$$480 \quad \pi F_v = -E \tan^{-1} \phi + E \left[\frac{\alpha^2 + (\beta + 1)^2 - 2\beta(1 + \alpha \sin \theta)}{AB} \right] \tan^{-1} \left(\frac{A\phi}{B} \right) + \frac{\cos \theta}{C} \left[\tan^{-1} \left(\frac{\alpha\beta - F^2 \sin \theta}{FC} \right) + \tan^{-1} \left(\frac{F \sin \theta}{C} \right) \right]$$

$$481 \quad \pi F_h = \tan^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{\phi} \right) + \frac{\sin \theta}{C} \left[\tan^{-1} \left(\frac{\alpha\beta - F^2 \sin \theta}{FC} \right) + \tan^{-1} \left(\frac{F \sin \theta}{C} \right) \right] - \left[\frac{\alpha^2 + (\beta + 1)^2 - 2(\beta + 1 + \alpha\beta \sin \theta)}{AB} \right] \tan^{-1} \left(\frac{A\phi}{B} \right)$$

$$482 \quad \alpha = \frac{L}{R}$$

$$483 \quad \beta = \frac{X}{R}$$

$$484 \quad A = \sqrt{\alpha^2 + (\beta + 1)^2 - 2\alpha(\beta + 1)\sin \theta}$$

$$485 \quad B = \sqrt{\alpha^2 + (\beta - 1)^2 - 2\alpha(\beta - 1)\sin \theta}$$

$$486 \quad C = \sqrt{1 + (\beta^2 - 1)\cos^2 \theta}$$

$$487 \quad \phi = \sqrt{(\beta - 1)/(\beta + 1)}$$

$$488 \quad E = \frac{\alpha \cos \theta}{\beta - \alpha \sin \theta}$$

$$489 \quad F = \sqrt{\beta^2 - 1}$$

490 The angle of tilt, θ , can be calculated as a function of wind speed u_w as (Pritchard and Binding, 1992):

$$491 \quad \frac{\tan \theta}{\cos \theta} = 0.666 Fr^{0.333} Re^{0.117}$$

492 where Fr is the Froude number $Fr = \frac{u_w^2}{g\phi}$, and Re is the Reynolds number $Re = \frac{u_w \rho_a \phi}{\eta_a}$, both non-dimensional
 493 numbers. ρ_a and η_a are, respectively, the density ($\sim 1.21 \text{ kg/m}^3$) and viscosity ($\sim 16.7 \mu \text{ Pa s}$) of air; g is
 494 gravitational acceleration ($\sim 9.81 \text{ m/s}^2$).



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